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We examine how rms’ exposure to prior disastrous events can inuence their stock mar-
ket footprint during the coronavirus crisis.While others have drawn comparisons between
past pandemics and Covid-19, we argue that such comparisons are skewed due to the un-
precedented reach and consequences of the latter. To better model the structural shock
caused by Covid-19 in the USA, we look at the 9/11 terrorist attacks and specically
examine how rms based in New York City back then reacted to the associated nan-
cial turmoil. While 9/11 and Covid-19 are categorically different events, their short-term
impacts on the stock market, and on New York exchanges in particular, are surprisingly
similar.We nd rms that nancially ‘survived’ 9/11 also managed to do better – or suffer
less – by about 7% in terms of stock returns during Covid-19, compared to control rms
that were not exposed to 9/11. In a sense, we show that companies’ prior exposure to 9/11
partly ‘immunized’ them against the consequences of a similarly destabilizing event, al-
beit two decades later. Interestingly, the trading volume of exposed rms increased due to
market buying pressures. Our analysis is robust to various nancial proxies, alternative
denitions of control rms and varying estimation windows.
Introduction
It is difcult to imagine an event in the past few
decades with similarly wide-reaching and catas-
trophic consequences for individuals, society and
the economy as Covid-19. The aggregate economic
damage caused by Covid-19 (henceforth, Covid)
is already well documented by international orga-
nizations such as the IMF and the World Bank,
as well as national statistics agencies around the
world.1 Indeed, a signicant part of the economic
turmoil caused by Covid is intermediated through
loss of productivity and lower or negative earn-
1See the various factsheets available at the IMF
Covid database (https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/
imf-and-covid19) and the World Bank Covid database
(https://www.worldbank.org/en/who-we-are/news/
coronavirus-covid19).
ings in the corporate sector. Research published
in nance journals since the emergence of Covid
similarly attests to its devastating impact on rms’
corporate nancial variables. Acharya and Stef-
fen (2020) show that rms drew down bank credit
lines and consistent with the risk of becoming a
fallen angel, the lowest-quality BBB-rated rms
behaved more similarly to non-investment-grade
rms. Halling, Yu and Zechner (2020) discuss how
Covid affected rms’ access to public capital mar-
kets. Bond issues increased substantially for all
bond types, while equity issues slowed tremen-
dously. Ramelli and Wagner (2020) argue that
rms more exposed to trade with China underper-
formed. Further, corporate debt and cash holdings
emerged as important value drivers. Salisu and Vo
(2020) show that stock returns were very sensitive
to any health news related to Covid.
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Our study attempts to ll an important gap in
this body of research. While certain sectors of the
economy, such as travel, tourism and hospitality,
suffered more heavily during Covid than others
(Izzeldin ., 2021), it is not sufciently clearet al
what cross-sectional variations exist among rms
in each industry sector. In other words, after con-
trolling for known factors such as industry char-
acteristics and nancial position that often con-
tribute to cross-sectional variations in corporate
responses, it would be theoretically interesting, and
practically of signicant importance, to explore
which particular rms showed more nancial re-
silience during theCovid disruption.Hence, we use
the Covid disruption as an empirical setting to ex-
amine corporate nancial resilience, and the com-
mon factors that contribute to it.
Crucially, we provide evidence suggesting that
rms’ exposure to prior disasters in the corporate
world makes them more resilient in the face of
new but fundamentally similar disruptions. Specif-
ically, we examine companies headquartered in
New York City (henceforth, NYC) and trading in
one of the city’s three stock exchanges. Among
such rms, we focus on those that were active both
during the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks
(henceforth, 9/11) and the 2020 Covid period. Im-
portantly, we show such rms displayed more -
nancial resilience during the Covid turmoil com-
pared to control groups. Our ndings show that the
stock price losses of these companies during Covid
were about 7% lower compared to rms that were
not exposed to 9/11. This gure is both statistically
and economically signicant, and represents bil-
lions of dollars of market value ‘saved’ compared
to the control group.
In other words, the group of rms which were
exposed to 9/11 are found to be, in some sense, im-
munized or more immune to the nancial hit of
Covid compared to their peers. We argue that this
may be due to such rms having learnt how to cope
with a sudden shock to their workforce, manage-
ment (given their central location in NYC), ofce
space, supply chains (see e.g. Harland, 1996; Ver-
beke, 2020), need for urgent crisis management,
stakeholder communication and, of course, shocks
to their share price and associated nancial met-
rics. Thus, their resilience is a product of organi-
zational learning and internalizing this learning in
their organizational culture (e.g. Walsh and Ung-
son, 1991). It is also plausible that the investors of
such rms may ‘price in’ the fact that they have
learnt their lesson and, therefore, regard them as
more resilient against systemic shocks of a com-
parable nature.2
Organizational learning from disasters (Smith
and Elliott, 2007) initially takes place at the level
of senior managers who have to reght the disas-
ter at hand, and then trickles down the organiza-
tion. Disasters, by denition, are ‘serious disrup-
tions of the functioning of a community or a soci-
ety at any scale due to hazardous events interacting
with conditions of exposure, vulnerability and ca-
pacity, leading to one or more of the following: hu-
man, material, economic and environmental losses
and impacts’ (UNGA, 2017). Prior literature also
refers to ‘surprises’ (e.g. Bechky and Okhuysen,
2011; Lampel andShapira, 2001), ‘rare events’(e.g.
Lampel, Shamsie and Shapira, 2009; Starbuck,
2009), ‘catastrophes’ (e.g. Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa
and Hollingshead, 2007) or ‘crises’ (e.g. Rerup,
2009). While not the direct focus of our study, the
question of which managerial skills and attributes
may facilitate more effective decision-making and
subsequent learning in disaster situations (Akinci
and Sadler-Smith, 2019) is an interesting research
focus in and of itself (Amabile and Pratt, 2016).
Particularly with unprecedented disasters that
require low-probability yet high-consequence de-
cisions, and where situations with no similari-
ties to previous experiences arise, adaptiveness
and agility can be demonstrated in the form of
initial situational assessment followed by men-
tal simulation and consultation (Curnin, Brooks
and Owen, 2020). The learning process is driven
by two key cognitive functions. Firstly, expert in-
tuition, domain-specic learning and experience
(Salas, Rosen and DiazGranados, 2010) and sec-
ondly, rational, analytical thinking – see, inter alia,
the 4Is organizational learning framework (Intu-
iting, Interpreting, Integrating, Institutionalizing)
of Crossan, Lane and White (1999).
2While the timelines of 9/11 and Covid are not identical,
we argue that the learningwhich took place following 9/11
coupled with the organizational memory has equipped
survivor rms to fare better during Covid. The similar-
ities between the two events are not just limited to the
shocks exerted on their workforce, management, ofce
space, supply chains, share price and associated nancial
metrics. Their legacy effects have also been comparable
and long-lasting. In fact, 9/11 left a long shadow of fear
and concern on the public in relation to new attacks, not
dissimilar to current fears around new virus variants.
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While Covid and 9/11 are categorically differ-
ent disasters, for our purposes, the comparison be-
tween them is appropriate for several reasons. Both
these events were exogenous, unforeseen and ex-
tremely destabilizing. As far as the USA is con-
cerned, NYC was very severely hit and was in fact
the epicentre of both these disasters. And the same
goes for rms headquartered in NYC or trading
in that city. Both events shocked investors and the
stockmarkets, and both had devastating effects on
supply chains, although far more short-lived in the
case of 9/11. Air travel was similarly suspended
during 9/11, albeit again for amuch shorter period,
and consequences for the tourism and hospitality
sectors were similarly grave. As a recent Financial
Times article puts it, ‘the industry in late 2001 ex-
perienced many of the ills it is seeing now. Airlines
bled cash. Their survival was threatened. Govern-
ment stepped in with nancial support, as they are
doing today’ (Skapinker, 2020).3
Further, we nd that the difference between
rms exposed to 9/11 and their peers is not lim-
ited to their stock price reaction. The immunized
rms happen to outperform their peers in a clean
difference-in-difference estimation of both stock
returns and market-adjusted excess returns. In
fact, controlling for overall risk, immunized rms
earn 14% higher raw returns and 15% higher ex-
cess returns compared to the control group. When
we control for Covid-specic risks, these gures
go down only to 13%, which is still a considerable
difference statistically and economically. In addi-
tion, the trading volume of the immunized rms
increases due to buying pressures in the market,
again compared to their peers. These results are
consistent across various industry sectors, as ex-
plained in the main empirical section of the paper.
This study makes several important contribu-
tions to the nance and management literatures.
Firstly, our ndings contribute to the literature on
stock market reactions to the spread of diseases.
For example,McTier, Tse andWald (2013) explain
how the US market reacts to inuenza through
time but do not highlight any patterns in the cross-
sectional variation among rms. Our paper con-
3Of course, these parallels have limitations. For exam-
ple, it is documented that following air crash incidents,
the overall air travel industry can benet from customers
shifting airlines (Bosch, Eckard and Singal, 1998). Such
an outcome is unlikely to occur with Covid given the re-
strictions imposed on air travel globally.
tributes to this body of work by highlighting a
novel relationship between rms’ prior disaster ex-
posures and their market resilience during health
pandemics.
Secondly, our ndings contribute to the litera-
ture on stock market reactions to terrorist events –
see, for example, Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman
(2011), Karolyi (2006) and Nikkinen and Vähä-
maa (2010) – by showing that, at least in the case
of 9/11, these shocks can make the surviving rms
more resilient and their investorsmore forgiving or
trusting once similar disasters strike again.
Thirdly, these results provide novel evidence that
markets have long-term memory – see, for exam-
ple, Lo (1991). This means that markets can ‘price
in’ the success or failure of rms in extreme events,
even after a couple of decades.
Fourthly, and equally importantly, we con-
tribute to the management literature on organiza-
tional learning and memory by showing that prior
exposure to unprecedented and traumatic events
can have organizational learning and resilience
benets over the long term. The impact of or-
ganizational learning capabilities on a company’s
prospects for survival are widely documented in
the management literature (see e.g. Argyris and
Schön, 1996; Camps and Luna-Arocas, 2012).4
Our study contributes to this literature by high-
lighting the role of prior exposure to disasters
in triggering organizational learning. While we
cannot distinguish incremental from radical inno-
vation in our rms, we nonetheless can best under-
stand the key ndings through the lens of compa-
nies ‘learning’ how to respond to systemic shocks
of a disastrous nature, even if they are few and far
between. The organization’s response to these sys-
temic shocks, when initially confronted with them,
becomes integrated in organizational culture and
work processes that constitute its ‘organizational
memory’ (e.g. Walsh and Ungson, 1991).
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. The second section discusses the relevant
4Examples from the nancial services industry include
Morgan and Turnell (2003), who show that the market
information processing and analytical capabilities of or-
ganizations improve when they exhibit more favourable
learning values. Chiva, Ghauri and Alegre (2014) explore
the interface of organizational learning and innovation,
by categorizing organizations into those characterized by
adaptive learning and incremental innovation and those
characterized by generative learning and radical innova-
tion.
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literature and motivates our theoretical hypothe-
ses. The third section presents the data sample,
data sources and denitions of variables. In the
fourth section, we present the empirical approach
and headline ndings. The fth section conducts
a range of robustness tests which mainly conrm
our core results, and the sixth section concludes.
Related literature and hypothesis
development
Despite the recent emergence of Covid, there is
already a substantial and fast-growing body of
work on its nancial aspects and implications. Alt-
man (2020) shows that the non-nancial corpo-
rate debt market in the USA reached a record
percentage of gross domestic product. Further,
investor appetite grew for higher promised yields
on risky xed-income assets. Baker et al. (2020a,
2020b) argue that Covid resulted in a year-on-year
contraction in US real GDP of nearly 11% as of
2020 Q4. Guerrieri et al. (2020) illustrate that stan-
dard scal stimulus was less effective than usual,
andmonetary policy, unimpeded by the zero lower
bound, had magnied effects by preventing rm
exits. Chronopoulos, Lukas and Wilson (2020)
nd that discretionary spending declined through-
out the pandemic. Favero, Ichino and Rustichini
(2020) show that policies of epidemic containment
were efcient with respect to the number of fatal-
ities and GDP loss. Gormsen and Koijen (2020)
discuss that dividends shrank throughout the pan-
demic, and scal stimulus boosted the stock mar-
ket and long-term growth but did little to increase
short-term growth expectations. And Mamaysky
(2020) argues that markets frequently reacted to
uninformative news in the early stages of the pan-
demic. As far as pandemics go, the health im-
pact and economic footprint of Covid are unprece-
dented, at least as far back as the inuenza pan-
demic of 1918. However, some prior studies have
given warnings about these expected economic
costs in foresight. For example, Bloom, Cadarette
andSevilla (2018) discuss the costs suchpandemics
incur to both public and private health organiza-
tions, as well as losses to workforce productivity
and disruption caused by social distancing.
In a similar vein, Fan, Jamison and Summers
(2018) estimate the expected annual losses from
pandemics to be around 500 billion USD, which
comes to about 0.6% of global income, which –
with the benet of Covid hindsight – appears to
be a great underestimation. Similar studies empha-
sizing the need to anticipate and manage the eco-
nomic consequences of pandemics include Lewis
(2001), Tam,Khan and Legido-Quigley (2016) and
several others – see Goodell (2020) for a summary.
Of notable mention is the World Health Organi-
zation’s Global Preparedness Monitoring Board
(2019) report, which warns, only 3 months before
the outbreak of Covid, that the world is at immi-
nent threat of a global pandemic with little or no
precaution being undertaken.
Another strand of the epidemics and pandemics
literature (Page, Song and Wu, 2012) compares
their nancial hit to other forms of natural and
man-made disasters. These can include various
natural disasters (Toya and Skidmore, 2007), air
crashes (Ho, Qiu and Tang, 2013) and acts of ter-
rorism (Llussa and Tavares, 2011). In particular,
research on the nancialmarket impact of terrorist
attacks can provide some form of parallel. While
terrorist events are localized in their initial mani-
festation, they are by their nature designed to cre-
ate a widespread shift in public mood (Goodell,
2020) and by implication, investor sentiment. This
is an angle through which one can compare the
market impact of a pandemic in its early days with
that of a terrorist attack.
The associated spillover effects of terrorist at-
tacks are, , discussed by Karolyi (2006),inter alia
who concludes that, with some caveats, spillovers
indeed occur as evidenced in tests examining
volatility or beta risks with asset-pricing mod-
els. As regards 9/11, Choudhry (2005) examines
whether the attacks created a shift in market betas.
Similarly, Hon, Strauss and Yong (2004) nd that
the 9/11 attacks led to higher correlations in global
markets, not unlike the Covid episode, with some
geographic variations. Other studies with similar
ndings include Boin (2004), Chesney, Reshetar
and Karaman (2011) and Nikkinen and Vähämaa
(2010).
Organizational resilience can be broken down
into three components, namely, anticipation, cop-
ing and adaptation (Ducheck, 2020). We pro-
pose that while companies exposed to the 9/11
shock were not necessarily superior in anticipat-
ing the Covid shock, they were better at coping
with its associated tremors – such as its effects on
their supply chain, workforce and customers. It
is also likely that such companies will adjust and
adapt better once the Covid chapter is completely




nline Library - 082.036.113.215 - /doi/epdf/10.1111/1467-8551.12539] at [06/09/2021].


















































Days Covid-19 Cases Covid-19 Deaths
Figure 1. Ofcial Covid-19 cases and deaths in New York City
This gure presents the daily new Covid-19 cases and deaths in New York City between 2 March 2020 and 30 April 2020. The very rst
ofcial Covid-19 case was after 2 March. Data obtained fromNYC government website.
closed, although we cannot formally test this as
Covid is still an unfolding though near-ending
turmoil.
Therefore, we hypothesize that prior exposure
to disastrous events (terrorist attacks in particular)
can result in rms having a ‘softer landing’ when a
new unforeseen event of similar nature hits them.
In other words, we expect nancial markets to re-
member and ‘price in’ a company’s prior success-
ful experience with disastrous events that threaten
their supply chains and workforce, among other
things. Therefore, we form the following testable
hypothesis:
H1: Firms with prior exposure to disastrous events
experience smaller stockmarket losses during the
Covid pandemic.
Also, as explained above, we expect such rms to
be in more demand by the market. This, we would
anticipate, is because investors value the advanta-
geous position of these immunized rms relative
to their peers. Hence:
H2: Firms with prior exposure to disastrous events
have higher trading volumes due to larger buying
pressures from the market.
Later, we test these hypotheses together with a
range of alternative variations and a battery of ro-
bustness tests.
Sample selection and variables
Data sample
The period of our analysis runs from 9 December
2019 to 30 April 2020. The rst ofcial Covid cases
in NYC date back to 2March 2020, and the deaths
start soon after.5 Figure 1 shows that the daily new
Covid cases inNYC have a slowprogress until mid-
March, when they jump from 620 to 2,122, and
keep rising until 6 April to 6,367, the peak of the
rst wave in NYC. The daily new cases drop to
1,004 by 30 April. The daily newdeaths have a sim-
ilar distribution. They start on 11March and peak
at 590 on 7 April. The number of daily new deaths
drops to 56 by 30 April. The time interval for this
study includes 2 months as the treatment period
and 3 months before 2 March 2020 as the control
period.
To determine the rms in our sample,immune
we consider companies with headquarters (HQ)
in NYC that were traded in three major stock
markets in NYC, that is the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE), NYSE American and NASDAQ
stock market, between 10 September 2001 and 30
November 2001 – a 3-month period. We aim to
focus on rms that have experienced the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks at rst sight, with the highest expo-
sure. Of the rms above, only 114 were still traded
5For more details, see https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/
covid/covid-19-data.page
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Panel A: Immune Firms Panel B: Control Firms 
 
Figure 2. Industry distribution for immune and control rms
This gure shows the distribution of immune and control rms according to their industry classication. Industry aggregation is based on
four-digit SIC codes. The 30 industry classication codes are used to construct the industries. They are obtained from Kenneth French’s
website. The period is between 9 December 2019 and 30 April 2020. Panel A: Distribution for 114 immune rms. Panel B: Distribution for
331 control rms.
[Colour gure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
during the Covid period, thus resulting in a set of
114 immune rms. For the control sample, we in-
clude rms with HQ in NYC that were traded on
the NYSE, NYSE American or NASDAQ during
the Covid period but not during the 9/11 period.
These are the control rms that have not experi-
enced the 9/11 shock before but are exposed to
Covid. We have 331 control rms in the sample.
Overall, the sample includes 445 rms and 43,124
rm-day observations.
Figure 2 presents the breakdown of immune and
control rms by four-digit SIC industries. Both
groups have a similar distribution of rms across
industries. The majority of immune and control
rms operate in the Finance sector (60% and 57%,
respectively). Services and Healthcare are the next
big industries for both immune and control groups.
These three sectors correspond to about 80% of
immune (76% of control) rms. Remaining minor
industries include Consumer Goods, Communica-
tion, Utilities and Others.
Firm and market variables
Table 1A describes the variables used in this paper.
We obtain daily data on rm stock prices, traded
volume and dollar volume for publicly traded US
rms fromCRSP. Excess returns are dened as the
daily returns in excess of the risk-free rate that is
proxied by the 1-month T-bill rate. Market activ-
ity is measured using three different variables: the
daily average traded volume of shares, dollar vol-
ume in US dollars and a signed version of traded
volume calculated as the product of the realized
daily returns and the daily average traded volume.
While the former two represent a proxy for the ag-
gregate fund ows that come into the marketplace,
the latter one gives a sense of the direction of trad-
ing activity. The signed traded volume takes a pos-
itive (negative) value if there is buy (sell) pressure
in the market (see e.g. Campbell, Grossman and
Wang, 1993; Llorente et al., 2002; Tosun, 2021).
As part of our robustness tests, we follow Mc-
Tier, Tse and Wald (2013) and construct the daily
change in natural logarithm of the traded volume
and the dollar volume as dependent variables. To
mitigate the inuence of outliers, all variables are
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
We use aggregate risk factors, such as mar-
ket risk, size, value, investment opportunities and
protability (see e.g. Fama and French, 2015) in
our models. In unreported tests, we also control
for momentum following Carhart (1997) and ob-
tain virtually similar and robust results. We obtain
factor-mimicking portfolios that proxy for these
risk factors on a daily basis from the Kenneth R.
French online library.6 The daily change in these
6https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/Ken.
French/data_library.html
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Table 1A. Denition of variables
Variable Description
Immune The dummy variable for rms with HQ in NYC and traded on NYSE, NYSE American and NASDAQ
during both 9/11 and the Covid period; 0 for rms with HQ in NYC and traded only during the
Covid period not 9/11.
Post The daily dummy variable equal to 1 between 2 March and 30 April 2020, and 0 between 9 December
2019 and 28 February 2020.
Return The daily stock return as a percentage.
Excess Return The daily stock return in excess of the risk-free rate that is proxied by the 1-month T-bill rate.
Traded Volume The amount of shares traded daily, in millions.
Dollar Volume The amount of shares traded multiplied by the daily closing price, in million USD.
Signed Volume The amount of shares traded multiplied by the daily stock return, in tens of thousands.
Delta Ln(Traded Volume) The daily change in natural logarithm of the traded volume.
Delta Ln(Dollar Volume) The daily change in natural logarithm of the dollar volume.
Market Value The daily closing price multiplied by common shares outstanding, in billion USD.
Mktrf The daily market return in excess of the risk-free rate that is proxied by the 1-month T-bill rate (Fama
and French, 2015).
SMB Small minus big (SMB) is the average return on the nine small stock portfolios minus the average return
on the nine big stock portfolios (Fama and French, 2015).
HML High minus low (HML) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on
the two growth portfolios (Fama and French, 2015).
RMW Robust minus weak (RMW) is the average return on the two robust operating protability portfolios
minus the average return on the two weak operating protability portfolios (Fama and French, 2015).
CMA Conservative minus aggressive (CMA) is the average return on the two conservative investment
portfolios minus the average return on the two aggressive investment portfolios (Fama and French,
2015).
Overall Risk Following Hassan . (2019), this risk measure relies on word counts that condition on proximity toet al
the use of synonyms for ‘risk’ or ‘uncertainty’. This measure counts the frequency of mentions of
synonyms for risk or uncertainty, divided by the length of the transcript.
Covid-19 Risk Following Hassan . (2020), this risk measure relies on word counts that condition on proximity toet al
the use of synonyms for ‘risk’ or ‘uncertainty’. This measure counts the frequency of mentions of
synonyms for risk or uncertainty, particularly related to Covid-19, divided by the length of the
transcript.
control variables is used in ‘change regressions’
as robustness tests. We also control for the aggre-
gate market behaviour in return regressions by the
total market value expressed in billions of USD.
As part of the robustness tests, we follow Has-
san et al. (2019, 2020) and further control differ-
ent rm-level risks.7 These risk measures rely on
word counts that condition on proximity to the
use of synonyms for ‘risk’ or ‘uncertainty’. Over-
all Risk (Covid-19 Risk) is the frequency of men-
tions of synonyms for risk or uncertainty (related
to Covid), divided by transcript length.
Table 1B provides the summary statistics for key
variables of immune and control rms, in Panels A
andB, respectively. Immunerms are larger in gen-
eral ($11.9 billion) compared to control rms ($1.4
billion). The right-skewed distribution of Market
Value suggests that there are few big rms in both
samples of immune and control rms. While the
7We obtain the data from https://www.rmlevelrisk.com
average Return seems to be around−0.1% for both
types of rms, highly right-skeweddistributions of
Traded andDollar Volume imply that the stocks of
certain rms are traded excessively more than oth-
ers. The positive mean values for Signed Volume
indicate that there is a buy pressure in the market.
Finally, Table 1C reports the correlations be-
tween the key variables.
Empirical approach and main ndings
Empirical approach
We rst examine whether markets react differ-
ently to immune rms than other control rms
during the Covid period. Abnormal returns (AR)
are measured using three different estimation win-
dows: 3-month, 6-month and 9-month, which end
60 days before the Covid period, that is 2 March
2020. We estimate abnormal returns using two
different event windows: 1-month and 2-month,
starting on 2 March 2020. Expected returns are
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Table 1B. Descriptive statistics of key variables
Panel A: Immune rms
Mean Standard deviation P25 Median P75
Market value (billion USD) 11.871 24.664 0.153 0.714 8.721
Return (%) 0.137 6.210− −3.071 0.000 2.812
Traded volume (millions) 2.867 5.532 0.077 0.621 2.441
Dollar volume (million USD) 117.121 239.300 0.576 4.630 99.865
Signed volume (10 thousands) 0.065 25.711 −1.473 0.000 1.198
Panel B: Control rms
Market value (billions) 1.362 6.300 0.058 0.198 0.730
Return (%) −0.099 6.222 2.271 0.000 2.298−
Traded volume (millions) 0.917 2.503 0.015 0.131 0.643
Dollar volume (millions) 17.393 66.415 0.150 1.142 7.443
Signed volume (10 thousands) 0.137 16.521 0.289 0.000 0.260−
This table presents mean, standard deviation, 25th percentile (P25), median and 75th percentile (P75) values of immune and control
rms in the sample. While Panel A provides the statistics for 114 immune rms, Panel B gives the values for 331 control rms. The
period is between 9 December 2019 and 30 April 2020. Market Value is daily closing price multiplied by common shares outstanding,
in billion USD. Return is the daily stock return as a percentage. Traded Volume is the amount of shares traded daily for a stock in
millions. Dollar Volume is the amount of shares traded multiplied by the daily closing price, in million USD. Signed Volume is the
amount of shares traded multiplied by the daily stock return in tens of thousands.
Table 1C. Correlation table
Excess Traded Dollar Signed Market
Return Return Volume Volume Volume Value Mktrf SMB HML RMW CMA
Return 1
Excess Return 1.000 1
Traded Volume 0.006 0.006 1
Dollar Volume 0.009 0.010 0.650 1
Signed Volume 0.594 0.595 0.009 1−0.009 −
Market Value 0.012 0.012 0.455 0.827 −0.009 1
Mktrf 0.543 0.541 0.011 0.299 0.005 1−0.021 −
SMB 0.210 0.211 0.013 0.105 0.001 0.055 1−0.014 −
HML 0.398 0.396 0.014 0.219 0.007 0.553 0.290 1−0.026 −
RMW 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.012 0.003 0.157−0.009 − −0.327 0.151 1
CMA −0.094 0.047 0.001 0.020−0.096 0.000 0.004 − − −0.492 0.134 0.408 1
This table presents the correlation between Return, Excess Return, Traded Volume, Dollar Volume, Signed Volume, Market Value,
Mktrf, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA. Variable denitions are given in Table 1A.
estimated using the recent ve-factor specication
outlined in Fama and French (2015). As discussed
by Blitz . (2018), we use the three-factor modelet al
and Carhart four-factor model in separate anal-
yses to address the concerns around risk–return
and momentum issues, as well as robustness con-
cerns regarding the two additional factors in the
ve-factor model.We estimateAR andobtain very
similar results. As is common in event study anal-
ysis, the identifying assumption is that the Covid
pandemic is not correlated with an immune rm’s
expected return after controlling for the tradable
risk factors. Lastly, we construct the cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) for rms in the Covid
period. To benchmark our results, we repeat this
exercise for control rms as well.
To better understand the causal effect of im-
munization on rms during the Covid pandemic
regarding returns and trading activity, we run a
difference-in-difference (DID) analysis by estimat-
ing a set of panel regressions of the form
Market reactioni t, = +α β Immunei × Postt
+ γ Controlsi t, + δi + µt + εi t, (1)
where Market reactioni t, represents return, excess
return, traded volume, dollar volume, signed vol-
ume for rm i on day t; Immune i is a dummy
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Table 2. Cumulative abnormal returns of immune and control rms during Covid
Event window: 1 month 2 months
Estimation window Immune rms Control rms Difference Immune rms Control rms Difference
I II III IV V VI
3 months 0.017 0.085− − *** 0.068*** 0.123*** 0.071*** 0.052*
(0.020) (0.012) (0.025) (0.013)
6 months 0.009 0.074− − *** 0.066*** 0.135*** 0.090*** 0.045*
(0.018) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013)
9 months 0.003 0.068− *** 0.071*** 0.156*** 0.106*** 0.050**
(0.018) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012)
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns for immune and control rms during the Covid pandemic. Daily abnormal returns
represent the return realized by an investor in excess of sources of systematic risk. The table reports the results using the Fama–French
Five-Factor model for different estimation periods (3 months, 6 months and 9 months), 2 months before the rst ofcial Covid-19
case in NYC. The results are given for two different event windows (1 month and 2 months) after the rst ofcial Covid case recorded
in NYC. The differences between CAR values of immune and control rms are also reported, along with the statistical signicance.




variable for immunized rms as described before;
Postt is a dummy that is equal to 1 for the 2-month
period starting on 2 March 2020, and 0 for the 3-
month period before 2 March 2020; Controls i t, is a
set of control variables, that isMktrf, SMB,HML,
RMW and CMA; δ i and µt are rm and time
xed effects, respectively. Immune and Post dum-
mies enter into the model as the interaction term
only because individually they are subsumed by
the rm and time xed effects, respectively. Mar-
ket Value is added as a control for all return re-
gressions. In robustness tests, Overall Risk and
Covid-19 Risk are included as additional controls.
In further analyses, the Postt dummy is adjusted
to cover only the rst month of the Covid period,
to measure the most immediate reaction of the
markets to immune rms. In other analyses, Delta
Ln(Traded Volume) and Delta Ln(Dollar Volume)
are used as dependent variables representing the
daily changes. The associated control variables are
also transformed into daily changes for those re-
gressions. For all analyses in this paper, standard
errors are clustered at the rm level.
Meyer (1995) discusses the main advantages of
the DID approach as its simplicity and potential
to evade the endogeneity problems that arise when
making comparisons between heterogeneous enti-
ties. Another key point of DID is that it accounts
for change due to factors other than the treatment
or intervention being studied. Also, since it fo-
cuses on change rather than the absolute levels, the
groups being compared can start at different lev-
els. Further, the DIDmethod allows the treatment
effect to be estimated, and when used in conjunc-
tion with a natural experiment, for example Covid,
the shock provides the randomization which is
essential for DID.Due to these reasons and advan-
tages, we decided to use the DID approach in this
study.
Considering the rapid increase in cases and
deaths in Figure 1, Covid appears to be an unan-
ticipated, random shock and its impact is imme-
diate and sharp. Hence, endogeneity of this shock
should not be an issue for our DID approach.
Further, our analysis on daily data includes a 2-
month post-Covid period in NYC. Due to these
reasons, we believe the DID model is adequate
concerning any periodicity. However, the assump-
tion is that the errors in the DID model are cor-
related and residuals are not independent. Hence,
simple residual resampling to replicate the correla-
tion in the data fails under a simple bootstrapping
method. To validate our results, we conduct block
bootstrapping as suggested by Bertrand, Duo
and Mullainathan (2004). In particular we imple-
ment the overlapping (moving) block bootstrap-
ping method, and our data are split into blocks
of 50 observations,8 that is block length b, as by
8As discussed by Radovanov and Marcikic (2014), block
length may inuence the entire block bootstrapping exer-
cise, while there are no denite rules on how to determine
the block length. Hence, we also repeat the analysis with
shorter and longer block lengths, for example 25, 75 and
100.
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Table 3. Difference-in-difference analysis on returns
Return (%) Excess return (%)
I II
Immune× Post 0.140** 0.146**
(0.067) (0.068)












Constant 0.685− *** −1.409***
(0.187) (0.189)
Firm xed effects YES YES
Day dummies YES YES
Observation 43,110 43,110
Adj. R2 0.360 0.367
This table presents estimates for Immune× Post along withMk-
trf, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA as control variables. Return
and Excess Return are the dependent variables. Immune is the
dummy variable for rms with HQ in NYC and traded on the
NYSE, NYSE American and NASDAQ during both 9/11 and
the Covid period, and 0 for rms with HQ in NYC and traded
only during the Covid period but not 9/11. Post is the daily
dummy variable that is equal to 1 between 2March and 30 April
2020, and 0 between 9 December 2019 and 28 February 2020.
Return is the daily stock return as a percentage. Excess Return is
the daily stock return in excess of the risk-free rate that is proxied
by the 1-month T-bill rate. Variable denitions are given in Ta-
ble 1A. Time and rm xed effects are included. Standard errors




denition we form n – b 1 blocks, where n is the+
length of the time series in our sample. Observa-
tions 1 to 50 will be block #1, observations 2 to 51
will be block #2, and so on. Hence, the blockboot-
strapping approach can replicate the correlations
by resampling inside blocks of data. In unreported
analyses, we obtain robust results consistent with
our original ndings.
Main ndings
In Table 2, we report the CARs for immune rms
and control rms during our event periods. We
start by discussing the results for CAR analyses
Table 4. Difference-in-difference analysis on trading activity
Traded Dollar Signed
Volume I Volume II Volume III
Immune× Post 0.543*** 18.890*** 0.607***
(0.189) (5.264) (0.233)
Mktrf 0.147− *** −2.172*** 0.997***
(0.018) (0.416) (0.127)
SMB 0.209*** 4.085*** 0.600**
(0.033) (0.829) (0.266)
HML −0.085*** −3.466*** 0.251
(0.019) (0.641) (0.171)
RMW 0.744*** 9.584*** −0.115
(0.112) (2.392) (0.541)
CMA −0.872*** −9.860*** −0.569
(0.117) (2.233) (0.899)
Constant 0.490*** 27.250*** 0.347
(0.083) (2.454) (0.455)
Firm xed effects YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES
Observation 43,124 43,124 43,108
Adj. R2 0.081 0.058 0.115
This table presents estimates for Immune Post along with×
SMB, HML, RMW and CMA as control variables. Traded Vol-
ume, Dollar Volume and Signed Volume are the dependent vari-
ables. Immune is the dummy variable for rms with HQ in NYC
and traded on the NYSE, NYSE American and NASDAQ dur-
ing both 9/11 and the Covid period, and 0 for rms with HQ in
NYC and traded only during the Covid period but not 9/11. Post
is the daily dummy variable that is equal to 1 between 2 March
and 30April 2020, and 0 between 9December 2019 and 28Febru-
ary 2020. Traded Volume is the amount of shares traded daily, in
millions. Dollar Volume is the amount of shares traded multi-
plied by the daily closing price, in million USD. Signed Volume
is the amount of shares traded multiplied by the daily stock re-
turn, in tens of thousands. Variable denitions are given in Ta-
ble 1A. Time and rm xed effects are included. Standard errors
are clustered by rms and given in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10.
∗∗p < 0.05.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
regarding how 1-month and 2-month event peri-
ods support our hypothesis that rms which sur-
vived the nancial distress associated with 9/11
(Sudarsanam and Lai, 2001) fared better during
the Covid period. The results are robust to the
choice of different estimation windows. We stress
the statistically signicant differences in results be-
tween immune and control rms. When we use
a 1-month event window, we observe that CARs
are not signicantly different from zero and im-
mune rms do not react to the Covid news. How-
ever, control rms have a negative reaction to the
Covid news. The differences between the CARs
of immune rms and those of control rms are
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Table 5. Placebo test and t test for returns and trading activity
Panel A: Placebo test on returns and trading activity for immune and peer (control) rms
Return (%) Excess Return (%) Traded Volume Dollar Volume Signed Volume
I II III IV V
Immune Post 0.036 0.035 0.028 0.503 0.071×
(0.043) (0.043) (0.032) (1.347) (0.079)
Market Value 0.105*** 0.105***
(0.018) (0.017)
Mktrf 0.782*** 0.724*** −0.052*** −2.630*** 0.735***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.012) (0.667) (0.081)
SMB 0.251*** 0.251*** 0.035* −0.117 0.150*
(0.062) (0.062) (0.018) (0.528) (0.081)
HML 0.100 0.094 0.020 0.087 0.197− − **
(0.066) (0.066) (0.017) (0.515) (0.100)
RMW −0.131 0.122 0.035 4.754− *** −0.434**
(0.158) (0.157) (0.055) (1.678) (0.220)
CMA 0.089 0.057 0.010 0.093 0.285− *
(0.102) (0.102) (0.022) (1.051) (0.157)
Constant 0.588− *** −1.457*** 0.746*** 30.680*** 0.030
(0.096) (0.096) (0.018) (0.781) (0.059)
Firm xed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observation 44,210 44,210 44,234 44,234 44,210
Adj. R 2 0.088 0.088 0.026 0.023 0.039
Panel B: T Test on returns for immune and peer (non-survivor) rms
Period Immune rms Peer rms Difference p
Full period 1984–2000 0.086 0.116 0.652−0.030
2002–2018 0.187 0.178 0.9260.009
5-Year period 1996–2000 0.108 0.109 0.991−0.001
2002–2006 0.231 0.211 0.9050.020
Panel A of this table presents estimates for Immune × Post along with Market Value, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA as control
variables. Return, Excess Return, Traded Volume, Dollar Volume and Signed Volume are the dependent variables. For this analysis, the
main model is the same, but the timeline is shifted 6 months backwards. Post is the daily dummy variable that is equal to 1 between 3
September 2019 and 31 October 2019, and 0 between 3 June and 30 August 2019. Immune is the dummy variable for rms with HQ in
NYC and traded on the NYSE, NYSE American and NASDAQ during both 9/11 and the Covid period, and 0 for the peer (control)
rms with HQ in NYC and traded only during the Covid period but not 9/11. Variable denitions are given in Table 1A. Time and rm




Panel B of this table gives t-test results on annual returns for immune rms and their peers (non-survivors). For this panel, peers
(non-survivors) are rms with HQ in NYC trading during 9/11 but not Covid. Immune rms are dened the same as before.
economically signicant and vary between 6.8%,
6.6%and 7.1%whenweuse estimation windows of
3, 6 and 9 months, respectively. When we consider
CARs during the extended 2-month eventwindow,
we observe again that the differences between the
CARs of immune and control rms are economi-
cally signicant and vary between 5.2%, 4.5% and
5%, respectively.
Table 3 presents results from our DID estima-
tions for rms exposed to 9/11 and those that were
not. The rst column reports results for stock re-
turns and the second column reports results for ex-
cess returns. The ndings are robust to the choice
of return denitions. The DID term is Immune ×
Post, where Immune takes the value 1 if the rm
is exposed to 9/11 and survived, and 0 otherwise.
Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 during Covid,
and 0 otherwise. Control variables are signicant
with expected signs. We observe that the rms ex-
posed to 9/11 and survived have gained immunity
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Table 6. Additional risk factors
Panel A: Controlling for overall risk
Return (%) Excess Return (%) Traded Volume Dollar Volume Signed Volume
I II III IV V
Immune× Post 0.143** 0.150** 0.552*** 18.910*** 0.611***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.185) (5.265) (0.232)
Overall Risk −0.001 0.001− −0.006** − −0.016 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.049) (0.003)
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm xed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observation 43,110 43,110 43,124 43,124 43,108
Adj. R2 0.360 0.367 0.089 0.058 0.115
Panel B: Controlling for Covid-19 risk
Immune× Post 0.126 * 0.133** 0.541*** 18.740*** 0.606***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.189) (5.250) (0.234)
Covid-19 Risk 2.508− *** −2.547*** − −0.462 26.240*** −0.156
(0.908) (0.909) (0.293) (9.088) (1.614)
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm xed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observation 43,110 43,110 43,124 43,124 43,108
Adj. R2 0.360 0.367 0.081 0.058 0.115
This table presents estimates for Immune Post along with Overall Risk (Panel A) and Covid-19 Risk (Panel B) as additional control×
variables. Original control variables are also included in the model. Return, Excess Return, Traded Volume,Dollar Volume and Signed
Volume are the dependent variables. Following Hassan . (2019, 2020), Overall Risk (Covid-19 Risk) relies on word counts thatet al
condition on proximity to the use of synonyms for ‘risk’ or ‘uncertainty’. This measure counts the frequency of mentions of synonyms
for risk or uncertainty divided by transcript length. Variable denitions are given in Table 1A. Time and rm xed effects are included.




and learnt from such a disastrous experience, as
they earn 14% (14.6%) more than their peers in
stock returns (excess returns) during the Covid cri-
sis. These ndings support H1.
Table 4 presents results from our DID estima-
tions on trading volume, dollar volume and signed
volume for rms that faced 9/11 and those that
did not during the Covid crisis. The results are ro-
bust to the choice of trading volume denitions.
For all measures of trading activity, we observe the
rms that were exposed to 9/11 and survived have
learnt how to manage such crises as their trading
activity was signicantly higher than that of their
peers during Covid, with coefcient estimates of
0.5 forTradedVolume, 18.9 for DollarVolume and
0.6 for Signed Volume. The positive coefcient for
SignedVolume indicates that the higher trading ac-
tivity is due to buy pressure by investors request-
ing more shares of immune rms. These results
support H2.
Robustness tests
Tests on resilience and peer rms
To analyse the resilience of immune rms, we con-
duct a placebo test where we keep our main model
the same but shift the timeline 6months (also 9 and
12 months in untabulated analyses) backwards. If
our main results are driven by the resilience or sur-
vivorship of immunerms, then those rms should
still perform better than their peers, that is control
rms, in ‘normal times’ when they cannot benet
from their prior 9/11 experience. Statistically in-
signicant results in Panel A of Table 5 indicate
that resilience (or survivorship) of immune rms
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Table 7. First month of Covid pandemic
Return (%) Excess Return (%) Traded Volume Dollar Volume Signed Volume
I II III IV V
Immune× Post 0.336*** 0.343*** 0.724*** 31.140*** 0.011
(0.126) (0.128) (0.200) (7.628) (0.318)
Market Value 0.063*** 0.062***
(0.014) (0.014)
Mktrf 0.628*** 0.656*** 0.092*** 0.864** 0.796***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.017) (0.431) (0.112)
SMB 0.361** 0.434*** 0.221*** 0.750 0.290
(0.143) (0.144) (0.045) (1.240) (0.342)
HML 0.823*** 0.759*** −0.409*** −3.748** 1.518***
(0.162) (0.163) (0.067) (1.647) (0.374)
RMW −1.275*** −1.278*** 0.340*** 7.812*** −1.239***
(0.164) (0.166) (0.050) (1.410) (0.379)
CMA −0.560 −0.360 0.999*** 10.060** −1.031
(0.403) (0.407) (0.174) (4.463) (0.933)
Constant 0.728− *** −1.376*** 1.020*** 34.101*** −0.042
(0.123) (0.124) (0.034) (1.249) (0.238)
Firm xed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observation 33,885 33,885 33,897 33,897 33,885
Adj. R 2 0.382 0.381 0.103 0.073 0.124
This table presents estimates for Immune× Post along withMarketValue, SMB,HML, RMWand CMA as control variables. Return,
Excess Return, Traded Volume, Dollar Volume and Signed Volume are the dependent variables. For this analysis, Post includes only
the rst month of the Covid period. Particularly, Post is the daily dummy variable that is equal to 1 between 2 March and 31 March
2020, and 0 between 9 December 2019 and 28 February 2020. Immune is the dummy variable for rms with HQ in NYC and traded
on the NYSE, NYSEAmerican and NASDAQ during both 9/11 and Covid, and 0 for rms with HQ in NYC and traded only during
Covid but not 9/11. Variable denitions are given in Table 1A. Time and rm xed effects are included. Standard errors are clustered




is not the reason leading our main results. Further,
we compare the immunerms to their peers during
9/11 which did not survive until Covid, that is non-
survivors. Considering a full period and 5-year pe-
riod before and after 9/11, we conduct t tests on
annual stock returns. The statistically insignicant
results in Panel B of Table 5 show that immune
rms do not perform differently from their peers,
either pre- or post-9/11.
Additional risk factors
In this section we introduce additional risk factors.
Panel A of Table 6 reports results for Overall Risk
and Panel B for Covid-19 Risk, which we measure
following the methodology as described inHassan
et al. (2019, 2020). We use word counts that con-
dition on proximity using synonyms for ‘risk’ or
‘uncertainty’ overall or related to Covid scaled by
the length of the transcript. Controlling for overall
risk, rms exposed to the 9/11 shock earn 14.3%
more in returns and 15% more in excess returns
and have signicantly higher trading activity re-
gardless of the measure we use. Similarly, when we
control for Covid-19 Risk in particular, immune
rms earn 12.6% and 13.2% higher returns and
excess returns than control rms and have higher
trading activity during Covid.
Focused time period
In this section we focus on the very rst outbreak
period for Covid, that is the rst month, to capture
the very initial reaction of the markets towards
immune rms (see Table 7). Our results indicate
that during the initial outburst of Covid, rms
that survived 9/11 earn economically signicant
and higher returns compared to their peers. Partic-
ularly, rms that survived 9/11 earn 33.6% (34.3%)
more in (excess) returns than their peers during
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Immune× Post 0.010* 0.012**
(0.005) (0.006)
Delta Mktrf −0.005 0.005−
(0.006) (0.007)
Delta SMB 0.001 0.004−
(0.013) (0.014)
Delta HML 0.017− * −0.012
(0.009) (0.010)
Delta RMW 0.081− ** −0.109***
(0.038) (0.040)




Firm xed effects YES YES
Day dummies YES YES
Observation 42,679 42,679
Adj. R2 0.026 0.022
This table presents estimates for Immune Post alongwithDelta×
Mktrf,Delta SMB, DeltaHML,DeltaRMWandDeltaCMAas
control variables.Delta Ln(TradedVolume) andDelta Ln(Dollar
Volume) are the newdependent variables. FollowingMcTier, Tse
andWald (2013),Delta Ln(TradedVolume) andDelta Ln(Dollar
Volume) are calculated as the daily change in natural logarithm
of the traded volume and dollar volume, respectively. Immune is
the dummyvariable for rmswith HQ in NYCand traded on the
NYSE,NYSEAmerican andNASDAQduring both 9/11 and the
Covid period, and 0 for rms with HQ in NYC and traded only
during the Covid period but not 9/11. Post is the daily dummy
variable that is equal to 1 between 2 March and 30 April 2020,
and 0 between 9 December 2019 and 28 February 2020. Vari-
able denitions are given in Table 1A. Time and rm xed effects





Covid. Similarly, their trading activity is signi-
cantly higher during this initial wave of Covid.
Different measures for trading activity
In this section we repeat the DID analysis us-
ing two different measures of trading activity (see
Table 8). We follow the methodology in McTier,
Tse and Wald (2013) and dene Delta Ln(Traded
Volume) andDelta Ln(Dollar Volume) as the daily
change in natural logarithm of the traded volume
and dollar volume, respectively. This measure is
t for our purpose as it introduces a daily change
setup in the time frame of analysis, where infor-
mation changes on a daily basis and there is am-
ple uncertainly. Yet we observe that our main re-
sults are robust to the short-term denitions of
trading volumes. Coefcient estimates are signi-
cant and in the range of 1% and 1.2%, respectively,
forDelta Ln(Traded Volume) andDeltaLn(Dollar
Volume).
Analysis excluding the nance sector
The nance sector corresponds to about 60% of
our sample for immune rms, therefore it could
be argued that our results are driven by them. In
this section we exclude rms in the nance sec-
tor and repeat the analysis for rms in other ser-
vice and manufacturing industries (see Table 9).
Our results indicate that in fact those rms have
higher levels of immunization. Firms that survived
9/11 have returns (excess returns) that are 36.4%
(36.6%) higher than their peers. Similarly, all trad-
ing measures indicate trading activity is higher for
such survivors of 9/11.
Analysis of shutdown industries
One of the main features of the Covid pandemic
is the disproportionate treatment of immune rms
in shutdown versus running industry classica-
tion. Following state regulation, the shutdown
industries include Recreation, Entertainment,
Textile, Mining, Construction, Restaurants and
Hotels, and Others; while the running indus-
tries are Finance, Healthcare, Consumer Goods,
Communication and Utilities. We estimate DID
regressions separately for each group (see Table
10). We observe that immune rms in shutdown
industries perform much better than their peers
during the Covid crisis. They earn returns (ex-
cess returns) of 33.9% (33.1%) higher than their
non-immune peers during the Covid crisis, and all
trading activity measures indicate higher trading
volumes. Immune rms in industries that contin-
ued to operate during the Covid crisis earn 10.6%
(11.6%) more than their peers in stock returns
(excess returns), yet marginally statistically signif-
icant despite trading activity measures indicating
higher trading activity compared to their peers.
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Table 9. Analyses excluding nance sector
Return (%) Excess Return (%) Traded Volume Dollar Volume Signed Volume
I II III IV V
Immune× Post 0.364*** 0.366*** 0.379* 25.830*** 0.901*
(0.121) (0.122) (0.192) (8.853) (0.478)
Market Value 0.127*** 0.126***
(0.030) (0.031)
Mktrf 0.595*** 0.589*** −0.130*** −1.823*** 1.231***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.029) (0.647) (0.225)
SMB 0.425** 0.509*** 0.153*** 3.162** 0.237
(0.176) (0.179) (0.052) (1.287) (0.461)
HML 0.191* 0.141 −0.054* −2.852*** 0.444
(0.104) (0.106) (0.029) (0.944) (0.300)
RMW −0.164 0.218 0.520*** 4.483 1.780− *
(0.399) (0.404) (0.161) (3.254) (1.049)
CMA −0.750 0.988− −0.713*** −6.723* 1.732
(0.600) (0.609) (0.183) (3.414) (1.462)
Constant 1.083− ** −1.796*** 0.786*** 36.250*** 1.376
(0.433) (0.437) (0.133) (3.808) (1.024)
Firm xed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observation 18,604 18,604 18,617 18,617 18,602
Adj. R 2 0.235 0.243 0.053 0.060 0.089
This table presents estimates for Immune× Post along withMarketValue, SMB,HML, RMWand CMA as control variables. Return,
Excess Return, Traded Volume, Dollar Volume and Signed Volume are the dependent variables. The analyses are conducted excluding
the major industry in the sample (i.e. Finance) to test the robustness of the original ndings in Tables 3 and 4. Immune is the dummy
variable for rms with HQ in NYC and traded on the NYSE, NYSE American andNASDAQ during both 9/11 and the Covid period,
and 0 for rms with HQ in NYC and traded only during the Covid period but not 9/11. Post is the daily dummy variable that is equal
to 1 between 2 March and 30 April 2020, and 0 between 9 December 2019 and 28 February 2020. Variable denitions are given in





Economic turmoil during Covid is unparalleled
in recent history. Just as scientists are challenged
by the very many unanswered questions posed by
coronavirus, economists are similarly puzzled by
its associated economic consequences and how -
nancialmarkets have reacted to this unprecedented
disruption. In this paper, we show that to better un-
derstand how nancial markets capture and price
corporate risks associated with the pandemic, it
may be best to take a step back and look at events
that posed a similar degree of shock to the nan-
cial system. One such event with similar levels of
shock imposed on nancial markets is the terrorist
attacks of September 2001, which mainly targeted
NYC.
Having examined rms thatwere headquartered
in NYC and traded on one of its three stock ex-
changes during 2001, we zero in on those rms
that managed to nancially survive 9/11 and were
trading just before Covid hit them. We nd that
such rms displayedmore nancial resilience com-
pared to their peer group during the Covid tur-
moil. Specically, their stock price losses during
the Covid episode were lower by about 7% com-
pared to rms that were not exposed to the 9/11
shock, a gure both statistically and economi-
cally signicant, and representing billions of dol-
lars of market value ‘saved’ compared to the con-
trol group.
As explained in the empirical section of the pa-
per, we ran various other tests to show that this
nding is robust to alternative nancial proxies,
different denitions of estimation windows and
control rms. Interestingly, we show that such im-
munized rms that have learnt from similar strug-
gles in the past also experienced higher trading vol-
umes due to buying pressures from the market. In
other words, there is strong evidence that nancial
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Table 10. Analysis of shutdown and running industries during the Covid period
Panel A: Shutdown industries during the Covid pandemic
Return (%) I Excess Return (%) II Traded Volume III Dollar Volume IV Signed Volume V
Immune× Post 0.339** 0.331** 0.321* 23.201* 0.279
(0.168) (0.169) (0.187) (14.050) (0.224)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm xed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observation 10,516 10,516 10,523 10,523 10,514
Adj. R2 0.239 0.248 0.052 0.049 0.095
Panel B: Running industries during the Covid pandemic
Immune Post 0.106 0.116× * 0.577*** 17.690*** 0.685***
(0.075) (0.070) (0.220) (5.586) (0.261)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES
Firm xed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Day dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Observation 32,594 32,594 32,601 32,601 32,594
Adj. R2 0.408 0.413 0.092 0.064 0.125
This table presents estimates for Immune Post along with control variables. Return, Excess Return, Traded Volume, Dollar Volume×
and Signed Volume are the dependent variables. Analyses are conducted for shutdown and running industries during the Covid-19
pandemic, separately. Shutdown industries include Recreation, Entertainment, Textile, Mining, Construction, Restaurants and Hotels,
and Others; while running industries are Finance, Healthcare, Consumer Goods, Communication and Utilities. Immune is the dummy
variable for rms with HQ in NYC and traded on the NYSE, NYSE American andNASDAQ during both 9/11 and the Covid period,
and 0 for rms with HQ in NYC and traded only during the Covid period but not 9/11. Post is the daily dummy variable that is equal
to 1 between 2 March and 30 April 2020, and 0 between 9 December 2019 and 28 February 2020. Variable denitions are given in




markets ‘price in’ and thus value corporate expo-
sure to prior disasters, and by implication, the ad-
ditional organizational resilience gained through
such experiences.We argue that this organizational
resilience is created through organizations ‘learn-
ing’ how to respond to systemic shocks of a dis-
astrous nature, even if they are few and far be-
tween. The way organizations respond to these
systemic shocks becomes part and parcel of their
organizational culture and work processes that
constitute their ‘organisational memory’ (Walsh
and Ungson, 1991). Learning may also happen
through fostering attitudes and processes that ad-
dress error management within the organization
following challenging times, particularly through a
‘no blame’ organizational learning approach (e.g.
Provera, Montefusco and Canato, 2010).
In essence humans, and by extension or-
ganizations, categorize their knowledge around
frames/schema. These frames typically enable or-
ganizations to interpret events through organiza-
tional learning and memory processes. However,
at times, they can also lead to a distorted con-
struction of the accepted version of ‘reality’ (Goff-
man, 1974). This is particularly the case for trau-
matic and unusual events, where the sense-making
process is more easily disturbed and thus oppor-
tunities for genuine learning arise (e.g. Smith and
Elliott, 2007; Weick, 1995). In our context, this
learning occurred (and proved useful later during
Covid) in organizations that were exposed to the
unprecedented and traumatic experience of 9/11.
Thus, our ndings make contributions to (1) the
literature on market reactions to pandemics and
other public health events; (2) the bodyof work on
market reactions to terrorist events and the associ-
ated spillover; (3) the literature on the long-term
memory of stock markets; and (4) the literature
on organizational learning facilitated by exposure
to disastrous events. Furthermore, these results are
of considerable importance to the corporate sector
and to policymakers froma practical point of view,
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given that the likelihood of similar epidemics and
pandemics occurring in the future is seen as non-
trivial.
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